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Metacognition and mathematics education 
 
Wolfgang Schneider, Cordula Artelt 
Abstract  
The role of metacognition in mathematics education is analyzed based on theoretical and empirical work from the last 
four decades. Starting with an overview on different definitions, conceptualizations and models of metacognition in 
general, the role of metacognition in education, particularly in mathematics education, is discussed. The article em-
phasizes the importance of metacognition in mathematics education, summarizing empirical evidence on the relation-
ships between various aspects of metacognition and mathematics performance. As a main result of correlational stud-
ies, it can be shown that the impact of declarative metacognition on mathematics performance is substantial (sharing 
about 15–20% of common variance). Moreover, numerous intervention studies have demonstrated that “normal“ 
learners as well as those with especially low mathematics performance do benefit substantially from metacognitive 
instruction procedures. 
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1 Conceptualizations of  
metacognition 
Although the concept of “metacognition“ is now fre-
quently used and investigated in various fields of psy-
chology and education, its history is rather short. The 
first studies on metacognition were developmental in 
nature and initiated in the early 1970s by Ann Brown 
and John Flavell et al. (for reviews, see Brown, Brans-
ford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; Flavell, Miller, & 
Miller, 2002; Goswami, 2008; Schneider & Pressley, 
1997). Although various conceptualizations of the term 
“metacognition“ have been used in literature on cogni-
tive development, the concept has usually been broadly 
defined as any knowledge or cognitive activity that 
takes as its object, or regulates, any aspect of any cog-
nitive enterprise (cf. Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002). 
According to this conceptualization, metacognition re-
fers to people’s knowledge of their own information-
processing skills, as well as knowledge about the nature 
of cognitive tasks, and of strategies for coping with 
such tasks. Moreover, it also includes executive skills 
related to monitoring and self-regulation of one’s own 
cognitive activities. 
In a now classic paper, Flavell (1979) described three 
major facets of metacognition, namely metacognitive 
knowledge, metacognitive experiences, and metacog-
nitive skills, that is, strategies controlling cognition. 
Declarative metacognitive knowledge refers to the seg-
ment of “world knowledge“ that has to do with the hu-
man mind and its doings. According to Flavell et al. 
(2002), metacognitive knowledge about memory in-
cludes explicit, conscious, and factual knowledge about 
the importance of person, task, and strategy variables 
for memorizing and recalling information. For instance, 
knowing that an older child typically recalls more than 
a younger child is an indicator of person knowledge, 
and knowing that the time available for solving a math-
ematical problem is important for subsequent success 
indicates task-related metacognitive knowledge. Meta-
cognitive experiences refer to a person’s awareness and 
feelings elicited in a problem-solving situation (e.g., 
feelings of knowing), and metacognitive skills are be-
lieved to play a role in many types of cognitive activi-
ties such as oral communication of information, reading 
comprehension, attention, and memory. These facets of 
metacognition refer to a person’s procedural 
knowledge, which Brown et al. (1983) referred to as 
“knowing how“ and which can be further subdivided 
into monitoring and self-regulatory functions (see be-
low). For an excellent discussion of more subtle dis-
tinctions among various aspects of metacognition, see 
Kuhn (1999, 2000). 
From a historical perspective, the concept of 
“metamemory“, that is, children’s knowledge about 
memory, was explored first. Flavell’s (1971) concep-
tion of metamemory was global, encompassing 
knowledge of all possible aspects of information stor-
age and retrieval. Accordingly, metamemory included 
(but was not limited to) knowledge about memory func-
tioning, difficulties, and strategies. Flavell and Well-
man (1977) distinguished between two main 
metamemory categories, “sensitivity“ and “variables“. 
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The “sensitivity“ category referred to mostly implicit, 
unconscious behavioral knowledge of when memory is 
necessary and thus was very close to subsequent defi-
nitions of procedural metacognitive knowledge. The 
“variables“ category referred to explicit, conscious, and 
factual knowledge about the importance of person, 
task, and strategy variables for memory performance 
(see above). 
One impression that could be gleaned from the early 
research carried out by Flavell et al. was that a lot of 
metacognitive development was complete by age 8 or 
9 years (e.g., Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975). Sub-
sequently, Ann Brown et al. (Brown, 1978; Brown et 
al., 1983) counteracted this impression by focusing on 
procedural metamemory (“here-and-now-memory 
monitoring“) and children’s text processing. Research 
carried out by Brown et al. was able to demonstrate that 
metacognitive abilities develop quite slowly during the 
school years and that there is room for improvement 
even in adolescents and adults (see Brown et al., 1983). 
The taxonomy of metamemory presented by Flavell 
and Wellman (1977) was not intended to be exhaustive. 
Since the late 1970s, a number of additions and changes 
have been suggested (for comprehensive reviews, see 
Holland Joyner & Kurtz-Costes, 1997; Schneider, 
1999, 2010; Schneider & Pressley, 1997). For instance, 
Paris and Oka (1986) introduced a component labeled 
conditional metacognitive knowledge that focused on 
children’s ability to justify or explain their decisions 
concerning memory activities, whereas the declarative 
metamemory component first introduced by Flavell and 
Wellman (1977) focused on “knowing that“ conditional 
metamemory referred to “knowing when and why“. 
The procedural metamemory component emphasized 
by Brown et al., that is, children’s ability to monitor and 
self-regulate their memory-related behavior, refers to 
“knowing how“ and plays a major role in complex cog-
nitive tasks such as comprehending and memorizing 
text materials and mathematical problem solving. 
Although subsequent conceptualizations of metacogni-
tion expanded the scope of this theoretical construct, 
they also made use of the basic distinction between de-
clarative and procedural knowledge. For instance, 
Pressley, Borkowski, and Schneider (1989) systemati-
cally considered declarative and procedural compo-
nents of metacognition in developing a theoretical 
model that emphasized the dynamic interrelations 
among strategies, monitoring abilities, and motivation 
(e.g., Pressley, Borkowski, & O’Sullivan, 1985; Press-
ley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987, 1989). In their ex-
tension of the theoretical framework of metacognition, 
Pressley et al. proposed an elaborate model, the Good 
Information Processing Model, which linked aspects of 
procedural and declarative metacognitive knowledge to 
other features of successful information processing. 
According to this model, sophisticated metacognition is 
closely related to the learner’s strategy use, domain 
knowledge, motivational orientation, general 
knowledge about the world, and automated use of effi-
cient learning procedures. All of these components are 
assumed to interact. 
Overall, the distinction between declarative and proce-
dural metacognitive knowledge is widely accepted in 
developmental and educational psychology. Although 
these components are generally conceived of as rela-
tively independent, empirical findings suggest that they 
can mutually influence each other (see Schneider, Kör-
kel, & Weinert, 1987; Schraw, 1994). For instance, 
knowing about one’s own tendency to commit easy er-
rors may lead to increased self-regulatory activities in 
test situations. 
Taken together, the popularity of the metacognition 
construct is mainly due to the fact that it seems crucial 
to concepts of everyday reasoning and those assessing 
scientific thinking as well as social interactions. 
2 Assessment of metacognition 
Currently, a large number of different measures are be-
ing used to assess metacognitive knowledge and meta-
cognitive skills (also referred to as procedural metacog-
nitive knowledge). The most important measures are 
briefly summarized below. 
2.1 Measures of declarative metacognitive 
knowledge 
There are a variety of measures that have been used to 
capture what children know about cognitive activities. 
As noted by Cavanaugh and Perlmutter (1982), 
measures assessing declarative metacognitive 
knowledge are taken without concurrent memory or 
problem-solving assessment (independent measures), 
whereas measures of procedural metacognitive 
knowledge are collected simultaneously with the meas-
urement of memory activity (concurrent measures). 
Most measurements of declarative metacognitive 
knowledge in children have used interviews or ques-
tionnaires. One of the earliest and best-known inter-
view studies on declarative metamemory was carried 
out by Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell (1975) who as-
sessed children’s knowledge about person, task, and 
strategy variables relevant to memory performance in 
different settings. Given young children’s problems 
with questionnaires and interviews, alternative nonver-
bal assessment procedures such as videotape illustra-
tions of cognitive strategies were also used (for details, 
see the overviews in Holland Joyner & Kurtz-Costes, 
1997; Schneider & Pressley, 1997). 
To insure that children provide all their available meta-
cognitive knowledge in a test situation, Best and 
Ornstein (1986) used a peer tutoring assessment proce-
dure where older children (e.g., third or sixth graders) 
were asked to teach a memory strategy such as sorting 
items into semantic categories to younger children 
(e.g., first graders). Tutors’ instructions were taped and 
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subjected to content analyses. The measure of metacog-
nitive knowledge was the extent to which the instruc-
tions include appropriate strategy instructions. 
Overall, these alternative methods alleviated some of 
the problems usually related to the use of questionnaire 
measures. However, these measures still created diffi-
culties when applied to older children and adolescents, 
particularly when knowledge about text processing was 
assessed. There is the risk that social desirability factors 
reduce the validity of outcomes for this target group. 
Accordingly, more sophisticated measures of metacog-
nition have to be used with older children and adoles-
cents. For instance, Schlagmüller and Schneider (2007) 
came up with a standardized measure of metacognition 
that was based on a revised test instrument developed 
for PISA 2000 (see Artelt, Schiefele, & Schneider, 
2001). This instrument taps adolescents’ knowledge of 
strategies that are relevant during reading and for com-
prehension as well as recall of text information. For 
each of the six scenarios, students have to evaluate the 
quality and usefulness of five different strategies avail-
able for reaching the intended learning or memory goal. 
The rank order of strategies obtained for each scenario 
is then compared with an optimal rank order provided 
by experts in the field of text processing. The corre-
spondence between the two rankings is expressed in a 
metacognition score, indicating the degree to which 
students are aware of the best ways to store and remem-
ber text information. 
2.2 Measures of procedural metacognitive 
knowledge 
Concurrent measures of metacognitive skills are char-
acterized by the presence of a simultaneous cognitive 
activity. For instance, in the area of memory research, 
children and adolescents are asked to judge their 
memory performance shortly before, during, or after 
working on a memory task. The most studied type of 
procedural metacognitive knowledge is self-monitor-
ing, that is, evaluating how well one is progressing. The 
developmental literature has focused on performance 
prediction or ease-of-learning (EOL) judgments, judg-
ments of learning (JOL), and feeling-of-knowing 
(FOK) judgments. See Brown et al. (1983), Flavell et 
al. (2002), and Schneider and Lockl (2008) for over-
views. 
EOL judgments occur in advance of the learning pro-
cess, are largely inferential, and refer to items that have 
not yet been learned (Nelson & Narens, 1994). The cor-
responding memory paradigm is performance predic-
tion. In comparison, JOLs occur, during, or soon after 
the acquisition of memory materials and are predictions 
about future test performance on recently studied (and 
probably still recallable) items. Typically, paired-asso-
ciate learning tasks are used in this context. After com-
pletion of a learning trial, participants are shown the 
stimuli of a given pair and have to indicate how confi-
dent they are about whether they will remember the cor-
rect item response, either immediately or 10 min later. 
A number of developmental studies also explored chil-
dren’s feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments (e.g., 
Lockl & Schneider, 2002). These judgments occur ei-
ther during or after a learning procedure and are judg-
ments about whether a currently unrecallable item will 
be remembered at a subsequent retention test. 
Whereas self-monitoring involves knowing where you 
are with regard to your goal of understanding and mem-
orizing task materials, self-regulation includes plan-
ning, directing, and evaluating one’s mnemonic activi-
ties (cf. Flavell et al., 2002). Some developmental stud-
ies addressed aspects of children’s control and self-reg-
ulation processes such as termination of study (recall 
readiness) and allocation of study time (see the review 
by Schneider & Pressley, 1997). Recall readiness as-
sessments are made after learning materials have been 
studied at least once. Typically, participants are asked 
to continue studying until their memory of the materials 
to be learned is perfect. Another example of self-regu-
lation skills concerns the allocation of study time. This 
research observes how learners deploy their attention 
and effort when studying lists of items. For instance, 
developmental studies on the allocation of study time 
examined whether school children and adults were 
more likely to spend more time on less well-learned 
material. After a first free recall trial, participants had 
to distinguish between recalled and non-recalled items 
(monitoring component) and were then asked to select 
half of the items for additional study (self-regulation 
component). One problem with the paradigm of the al-
location of study time is that it may not only tap meta-
cognitive processes, but also be influenced by motiva-
tional variables (see Schneider & Lockl, 2002). 
2.3 Metacognition and education 
The importance of educational contexts for the devel-
opment of metacognitive knowledge was first high-
lighted in the field of memory development. In partic-
ular, findings from studies that focused on children’s 
strategy development indicated that most of the 
memory and metamemory development is not so much 
a product of age, but of education and practice. For in-
stance, in a recent longitudinal study on memory devel-
opment from kindergarten age to the end of elementary 
school, Kron-Sperl, Schneider, and Hasselhorn (2008) 
repeatedly presented the children of their sample with 
a semantic organization (sort–recall) task without giv-
ing any specific strategy cues. When performance of 
these children was compared with that of random sam-
ples of school children of the same age who received 
this task for the first time, substantial practice effects 
were found. Children of the longitudinal sample not 
only outperformed the control children regarding strat-
egy use and memory performance, but also showed 
considerably better task-specific metamemory. Obvi-
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ously, it does not require much effort to improve chil-
dren’s strategy knowledge in school. There is broad 
agreement that one way in which parents and teachers 
can facilitate cognitive development is by the develop-
ment of children’s metacognition (see Carr, Kurtz, 
Schneider, Turner, & Borkowski, 1989; Coffman, 
Ornstein, McCall, & Curran, 2008). Both classic and 
recent studies on this issue show that there is still room 
for improvement in this regard, but that considerable 
progress can be found. 
One of the most important outcomes of educational re-
search on school learning in the 1980s was the docu-
mentation of metacognitive processes that serve to 
guide students through learning tasks (see the compre-
hensive meta-analysis by Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 
1993). During the last three decades, several attempts 
have been made to apply metacognitive theory to edu-
cational settings (see Desoete & Veenman, 2006a; Paris 
& Oka, 1986; Moely, Santulli, & Obach, 1995; Pal-
incsar, 1986; Pressley, 1995). One interesting and ef-
fective approach to teaching knowledge about strate-
gies was developed by Palincsar and Brown (1984). 
The “reciprocal teaching“ procedure requires that 
teachers and students take turns executing reading strat-
egies that are taught with instruction occurring in true 
dialog. Strategic processes are made very overt, with 
plenty of exposure to modeling of strategies and oppor-
tunities to practice these techniques over the course of 
a number of lessons. The goal is that children discover 
the utility of reading strategies, and that teachers con-
vey strategy–utility information as well as information 
about when and where to use particular strategies. 
Teachers using reciprocal instruction assume more re-
sponsibility for strategy implementation early in in-
struction, gradually transferring control over to the stu-
dent (see Palincsar, 1986, for an extensive description 
of the implementation of reciprocal instruction; see Na-
tional Institute of Child Health and Human Develop-
ment, 2000, for a realistic appraisal of its benefits). 
During the 1980s and 1990s of the last century, numer-
ous studies explored the efficiency of strategy training 
approaches in school (for a review, see Schneider & 
Pressley, 1997). The basic assumption was that alt-
hough children in most cases do not efficiently monitor 
the effectiveness of strategies they use, they can be 
trained to do so. For instance, in a training program car-
ried out by Ghatala et al. (e.g., Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, 
& Goodwin, 1986), elementary school children were 
presented with paired-associate learning tasks. Before 
studying these lists, some children received a three-
component training. They were taught (a) to assess 
their performance with different types of strategies, (b) 
to attribute differences in performance to use of differ-
ent strategies, and (c) to use information gained from 
assessment and attribution to guide selection of the best 
strategy for a task. As a major result, it was shown that 
even children 7–8 years of age can be taught to monitor 
the relative efficacy of strategies that they use, and to 
use utility information gained from monitoring in mak-
ing future strategy selections. 
Another more large-scale approach concerns the imple-
mentation of comprehensive evaluation programs that 
aim at assessing the systematic instruction of metacog-
nitive knowledge in schools. As emphasized by Hol-
land Joyner and Kurtz-Costes (1997), both Moely et al. 
and Pressley et al. have conducted very ambitious pro-
grams of evaluating effective instruction in public 
school systems. For instance, Pressley et al. found that 
effective teachers regularly incorporated strategy in-
struction and metacognitive information about effec-
tive strategy selection and modification as a part of 
daily instruction. It seems important to note that strat-
egy instruction was not carried out in isolation, but in-
tegrated in the curriculum and taught as part of lan-
guage arts, mathematics, science, and social studies 
(see also Pressley, 2002). In accord with the assumption 
of the Good Information Processing Model outlined 
above (cf. Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1989), 
effective teachers did not emphasize the use of single 
strategies but taught the flexible use of a range of pro-
cedures that corresponded to subject matter, time con-
straints, and other task demands. On most occasions, 
strategy instruction occurred in groups, with the teach-
ers demonstrating appropriate strategy use. By compar-
ison, the work by Moely et al. (e.g., Moely, Santulli, & 
Obach, 1995) illustrated that the effective teaching pro-
cess described by Pressley et al. does not necessarily 
constitute the rule, and that effective teachers may rep-
resent a minority group in elementary school class-
rooms. Taken together, the careful documentation of 
instructional procedures carried out by Pressley et al. 
and Moely et al. has shown that there is a lot of potential 
for metacognitively guided instructional processes in 
children’s everyday learning. 
3 Metacognition and mathematics 
education 
3.1 Early studies on the relationship 
From the early 1980s on, researchers interested in 
mathematical problem solving became interested in the 
concept of metacognition. Questions frequently asked 
by scientists and mathematics educators included “can 
problem solving be taught?“, “what is the role of under-
standing in problem solving?“, and “what is the role of 
metacognitive behavior in problem solving?“ (e.g., see 
Lester, 1982; Silver, 1982). International studies on stu-
dents’ problem solving in the context of mathematics 
education repeatedly demonstrated that children did not 
perform well in tasks that required more than one step, 
and that mathematics teachers seemed to have diffi-
culty in planning and implementing lessons that build 
students’ problem-solving skills (for recent examples, 
see Kramarski, 2008). The new concept of metacogni-
tion appeared useful in improving the situation in this 
regard. For instance, Lester (1982) chose to include 
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metacognition in his list of questions, because he firmly 
believed that a person’s knowledge about one’s own 
cognitions before, during, and after a problem-solving 
period as well as his or her ability to maintain executive 
control in the sense of monitoring and self-regulation 
should significantly affect successful problem solving 
in mathematics. Thus, metacognitive activities were in-
volved in at least two of the five necessary components 
for successful problem solving, with mathematical 
knowledge and experience, skills in generating relevant 
“tool“ skills such as separating relevant from irrelevant 
information, and the ability to use a variety of heuristics 
representing the remaining components for successful 
mathematics performance. Verschaffel (1999) also 
pointed out that metacognition is of particular im-
portance in the process of mathematical problem solv-
ing. He assumes that metacognition in the sense of pre-
diction is instrumental during the initial stage of math-
ematical problem solving, when problem solvers try to 
build an appropriate representation of the problem. For 
the final stage of mathematical problem solving, in 
which the calculation outcomes need to be checked, he 
highlights the importance of metacognition in the sense 
of evaluation. In a similar vein, Brophy (1986) empha-
sized the importance of metacognition when teaching 
cognitive skills. In his view, one needs to address stu-
dents’ metacognition as well as their cognition in this 
process, and to supplement instruction with figurative 
knowledge about the skills (which skills are relevant) 
with instruction in operative knowledge (how to use the 
skills) and conditional knowledge (when and why to 
use the skills). Silver (1982) highlighted the importance 
of the problem solver’s decision making in the process 
of solving a mathematical problem, for instance, when 
choosing between different cognitive strategies to assist 
the solution. These decision processes are not only met-
acognitive in nature, but also influenced by one’s be-
liefs and values. Accordingly, in the context of mathe-
matical problem solving, a person’s beliefs about learn-
ing and problem solving, in general, and beliefs about 
mathematical problem solving, in particular, can act as 
important guides in the encoding and retrieval of math-
ematical material. 
In a similar vein, Garofalo and Lester (1985) claimed 
that a pure cognitive analysis of mathematical perfor-
mance is inadequate. They emphasized the importance 
of metacognition for the analysis and understanding of 
mathematical performance. Referring to the distinction 
between knowledge about and regulation of cognition, 
they argued that not only regulatory metacognitive be-
haviors but also person, task, and strategy categories of 
metacognitive knowledge are important in mathemati-
cal performance (see also Schoenfeld, 1983). Although 
the latter categories were originally devised to classify 
metacognitive knowledge about memory, they also 
seemed appropriate in the context of metacognitive in-
fluences on mathematical achievement. According to 
Garofalo and Lester (1985), person knowledge in the 
domain of mathematics includes one’s assessment of 
one’s own capabilities and limitations in this domain, 
both in general and with respect to particular mathemat-
ical topics or tasks. Task knowledge in the domain of 
mathematics consists of one’s beliefs about the subject 
of mathematics as well as beliefs about the nature of 
mathematical tasks. This knowledge also includes an 
awareness of the effects of task features such as con-
tent, context, structures, and syntax on task difficulty. 
It seems that third and fifth graders often possess rather 
inadequate or immature task knowledge. They “believe 
that verbal problems can be solved by a direct applica-
tion of one or more arithmetic operations and that the 
correct operations to use can be determined merely by 
identifying the key words; little planning or searching 
for meaning is necessary“ (Garofalo & Lester, 1985, p. 
167). More mature forms of task knowledge may in-
clude the notion that there usually is more that one way 
to solve a problem, or that two different methods of so-
lutions can yield the same correct results. Knowledge 
of this kind seems to have profound positive effects on 
children’s problem-solving attempts. It is important to 
note that correctness or veridicality of task knowledge 
can be regarded not only from a developmental per-
spective, but also from a structural point of view. Hold-
ing false beliefs about task characteristics can serve as 
one explanation for the phenomenon of “inert 
knowledge“, a term used for the fact that knowledge 
acquired in school contexts may not be used to solve 
out-of-school problems (e.g., “street mathematics“, see 
Nunes, Schliemann, & Carraher, 1993). Components of 
school knowledge and “out-of-school“ knowledge are 
often encapsulated and seldom processed together. The 
problem with “inert knowledge“ in the domain of math-
ematics may be related to the fact that students are not 
sufficiently confronted with “real-life“ mathematical 
problems, leading to the phenomenon of knowledge 
compartmentalization (in school vs. out of school). An-
other explanation for this phenomenon may be related 
to metacognitive deficits in the sense of a lack of ade-
quate regulation or comprehension monitoring (for a 
review, see Renkl, 1996). 
When discussing the relevance of Flavell and Well-
man’s (1977) strategy knowledge component for the 
domain of mathematics, Garofalo and Lester (1985) re-
ferred to knowledge of algorithms and heuristics. 
Moreover, they included in their list a person’s aware-
ness of strategies to aid in comprehending problem 
statements, organizing information of data, planning 
solution attempts, executing plans, and checking re-
sults. 
Although students’ tactical behaviors have been studied 
extensively in mathematics education, much less is 
known (and taught in school) about metacognitive 
monitoring and regulation. There is a need to focus on 
behavior relevant to strategy selection, cognitive mon-
itoring, and evaluation of cognitive processes. As noted 
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by Silver (1982), many of the driving forces that deter-
mine success or failure are metacognitive in nature. 
With this in mind, Garofalo and Lester (1985) reformu-
lated Polya’s influential four-phase description of prob-
lem-solving activities to properly incorporate metacog-
nitive activities. Their cognitive– metacognitive frame-
work for studying mathematical performance consists 
of an orientation phase (strategic behavior to assess and 
understand a problem), an organization phase (planning 
of behavior and choice of actions), an execution phase 
(regulation of behavior to conform to plans), and a ver-
ification phase (evaluations of decisions made and of 
outcomes of executed plans), each being filled with 
cognitive as well as metacognitive activities. The 
framework developed by Garofalo and Lester was in-
tended to serve as a tool for analyzing metacognitive 
aspects of mathematical performance. The authors also 
emphasized the importance of developing instructional 
treatments, which aim at incorporating metacognitive 
activities into mathematics instruction. This was seen 
as a new and important development at that time, since 
mathematics instruction had overemphasized the devel-
opment of heuristic skills and virtually ignored the 
managerial skills necessary to regulate one’s activities. 
For a more recent application of Garofalo and Lester’s 
framework, see Stillman and Galbraith (1998). 
One of the early attempts to highlight the importance of 
metacognition for mathematics education was pre-
sented by Schoenfeld (1987). He wrote his chapter in 
response to several mathematicians (e.g., Anna Hen-
derson and Henry Pollak), who asked him to explain 
the surplus value of metacognition for mathematics in-
struction. In his response, Schoenfeld emphasized the 
fact that the prevalent belief that classroom mathemat-
ics should consist of mastering formulas seemed ques-
tionable and wrong, mainly because it prevented stu-
dents from understanding that mathematics can be 
meaningful. In his view, metacognition has the poten-
tial to increase the meaningfulness of students’ class-
room learning, and the creation of a “mathematics cul-
ture“ best fosters metacognition. More specifically, 
such a “mathematics culture“ implies that students 
learn to think of mathematics as an integral part of their 
everyday lives, helping them to make connections be-
tween mathematical concepts in different contexts. Ac-
cording to Schoenfeld, the most important contribution 
of metacognition to the learning of mathematics can be 
seen in the acquisition of knowledge about one’s own 
thought processes and the development of adequate 
monitoring and self-regulation activities. In his seminal 
chapter on learning to think mathematically, Schoen-
feld (1992) provided a theoretically well-elaborated 
overview on problem solving, metacognition, and sense 
making in mathematics. In his conceptualization of 
mathematical thinking, metacognition, beliefs, and 
mathematical practices play a crucial role. Schoenfeld 
also elaborated on missing links with respect to theo-
retical model building for metacognition in the domain 
of mathematics. With respect to the “control“ compo-
nent, he described the theoretical state of the art as not 
yet well developed. In his view, more thought should 
be given to metacognitive activities, and the mecha-
nism of control seems unclear: “we do not have good 
theoretical models of what control is, and how it works“ 
(p. 364). The conceptual problems related to the mech-
anism as well as to the developmental pathways of con-
trol also include the question of whether control is do-
main independent or domain dependent, and which 
mechanisms may relate control decisions to domain 
knowledge. 
What is also apparent from Schoenfeld’s work is the 
clear need for implementing empirical research dealing 
with metacognition in mathematics education: Alt-
hough the situation has improved somewhat during the 
past few decades, much work is still required on prac-
tical and implementational levels. After extensive dis-
cussion of findings on the development of self-regula-
tory skills in complex subject matter domains, such as 
mathematics, Schoenfeld concluded that such develop-
ment is difficult to obtain, and that it often involves be-
havior modifications, including the unlearning of inap-
propriate control behaviors developed through prior in-
struction (see also Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002). He 
also states that concrete descriptions and studies re-
garding the teaching and learning of mathematics are 
still missing: “Here, in what may ultimately turn out to 
be one of the most important arenas for understanding 
the development of mathematical thinking, we seem to 
know the least“ (Schoenfeld, 1992, p. 365). As will be 
shown below, Schoenfeld’s critical analyses stimulated 
subsequent empirical research in this area. 
At about the same time, Pressley (1986) used the Good 
Strategy User Model (GSU, Pressley et al., 1987) de-
scribed above to explain his approach concerning ap-
propriate mathematics instruction. In his view, “strat-
egy“ is a broad term and very similar to “procedural 
knowledge“. Accordingly, mathematical algorithms 
and problem-solving routines qualify as strategies, and 
insights derived from the GSU can also be applied to 
the teaching of mathematics. Pressley (1986) described 
five broad principles of mathematics instructions: first, 
explicit teaching of mathematics strategies to young-
sters is recommended. These strategies also include 
self-testing and other monitoring strategies, which have 
proven helpful in many educational contexts. The sec-
ond principle referred to the teaching of specific strat-
egy knowledge, meaning that learners need to know 
when, where, and how to apply specific strategies. The 
third instructional principle emphasized the need for 
acquiring general strategy knowledge. For instance, 
children should be taught that errors are often the result 
of applying incorrect strategies rather than due to sim-
ple shortcomings in effort. The fourth instructional 
principle referred to the enrichment of the knowledge 
base. Here, the basic assumption is that relying on the 
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knowledge base is adaptive because increasing de-
mands are made on children’s arithmetic abilities with 
increasing age. Repeated practicing of elementary 
arithmetic operations should help in increasing the 
speed of mathematics operations, eventually leading to 
automatic, fast fact retrieval. Finally, the fifth instruc-
tional principle emphasized the need for first practicing 
each component separately, before attempts are made 
to coordinate the components. This sequential approach 
seems to cope best with the problem of limited atten-
tional resources and resource allocation. Repeated 
practicing of relevant mathematics strategies eventu-
ally reduces the attentional resources that are consumed 
by each component, thus facilitating the coordination 
of components in a second step. It seems interesting to 
note that both Pressley (1986) and Silver (1982) relate 
their metacognitive approaches to the work of Polya 
(1957, 1973), emphasizing that Polya’s heuristic sug-
gestions and analyses of good mathematical problem 
solving can be conceived of as metacognitive prompts. 
Early research on the importance of metacognition in 
mathematics education was not restricted to “normal“ 
student populations. Theoretical analyses and empirical 
research reflecting school problems of learning-disa-
bled children also addressed the issue of metacognition. 
For instance, Allardice and Ginsburg (1983) explored 
the role of executive processes in mathematics difficul-
ties. In their view, a lack of, or failing to use, cognitive 
strategies to control the processes of thinking, remem-
bering, and understanding may result in children failing 
to complete satisfactorily various academic tasks, in-
cluding mathematical ones. Their case studies revealed 
that children with mathematics difficulties lack effec-
tive procedures for learning number facts, but can be 
taught reasoning methods that turn out to be effective 
(for more details, see Russell & Ginsburg, 1981, see 
Braten & Throndsen, 1998 for a similar case study). 
3.2 More recent research on metacognition 
and mathematics education 
Research carried out in the 1990s and after the millen-
nium continued to use these core categories of meta-
cognition to explore the utility of the concept in re-
search with children and adolescents, assessing the pre-
dictive potential of metacognitive knowledge and skill-
fulness in mathematics (e.g., Carr & Jessup, 1995; Lu-
cangeli & Cornoldi, 1997; Desoete & Veenman, 
2006a). As can be inferred from the overview presented 
by Desoete and Veenman (2006b), a large proportion 
of the relevant studies focused on the importance of 
metacognitive skills, thus emphasizing the relevance of 
procedural metacognitive knowledge (e.g., planning, 
monitoring, self-control) on problem solving in mathe-
matics. In the following, the relevant evidence from 
correlational and intervention studies is summarized. 
4 Relationships between  
metacognition and mathematics 
performance 
4.1 Correlational evidence 
Although most correlational studies on the relationship 
between metacognition and mathematics performance 
were carried out with older students and adolescents, a 
few explored the importance of metacognitive 
knowledge for mathematics performance of young ele-
mentary school students. For instance, Carr, Alexander, 
and Folds-Bennett (1994) designed a longitudinal study 
to examine the role of second graders’ metacognitive 
knowledge in their mathematics strategy use over a 5-
month period. As a main result, it was shown that the 
use of internal strategies (e.g., counting in the head), 
but not external strategies (e.g., counting on fingers), 
was related to metacognition and effort attribution. 
Thus, Carr et al. (1994) were able to confirm the out-
come of previous research by Garofalo and Lester 
(1985), which already had indicated that elementary 
children possess knowledge about mathematics strate-
gies and can use this knowledge to their advantage. 
Moreover, the significant relations between metacogni-
tive knowledge and motivation (effort attribution) over 
time confirmed that both concepts contributed to in-
creases in mathematics performance. In a follow-up 
study, Carr and Jessup (1995) replicated the positive re-
sults by Carr et al. (1994), showing that metacognitive 
knowledge significantly influenced young elementary 
children’s developing strategy use. 
Similar evidence supporting the relative importance of 
metacognitive knowledge for mathematics perfor-
mance comes from a recently conducted first assess-
ment of our own ongoing longitudinal research project, 
which deals with the developmental pathways and in-
terrelations of metacognitive knowledge and prior 
knowledge in different school subject domains and will 
be described in some detail below. The first assessment 
took place in 2008 at the beginning of secondary school 
(fifth grade, 9–10-year-old children) in Germany. A to-
tal number of 763 fifth graders from three different ed-
ucational tracks (low, middle, and high) in Northern 
Bavaria, Germany, participated in this study. By taking 
into account age differences and curriculum-specific 
particularities, a test for metacognitive knowledge re-
lated to mathematics was constructed according to the 
rationale already described for the instrument on meta-
cognitive knowledge related to reading. To establish 
content validity of the metacognitive knowledge test, 
19 experts from German university departments of di-
dactics of mathematics were asked to examine and ver-
ify the ratings of the appropriateness of suggested strat-
egies for the described tasks. A total score summarizing 
students’ metacognitive knowledge was computed us-
ing those strategy pairs with clear superiority/inferior-
ity relations based on expert ratings. Overall, 
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Cronbach’s alpha of the metacognition test was 0.80, 
indicating sufficient internal consistency. 
Mathematics achievement, on the other hand, was 
measured using a newly developed test in accordance 
with the current Bavarian mathematics curricula for 
grade five. When analyzing performance differences as 
a function of academic track, it became apparent that 
students from the higher academic track not only per-
formed better on the mathematics test, but also knew 
more about cognitive and metacognitive strategies. 
Metacognitive knowledge and mathematics perfor-
mance shared about 17% common variance, with a bi-
variate correlation of r = 0.41. Even when controlling 
for the effects of general cognitive abilities, the corre-
lations remained significant (partial r = 0.31). When 
looking at gender differences in mathematics achieve-
ment, 10-year-old girls scored lower on the mathemat-
ics test than the boys. On the other hand, however, girls’ 
metacognitive knowledge was comparable to that of the 
boys, with girls even tending to be more knowledgeable 
than boys. This finding seems to indicate that girls do 
not take sufficient advantage of their metacognitive 
knowledge when working on mathematics problems. 
Findings from the German extension of the 2003 PISA 
study seem to confirm this interpretation for older stu-
dents. A very similar instrument measuring metacogni-
tive knowledge for mathematics (students’ knowledge 
base about mathematical strategies, i.e., cognitive and 
metacognitive strategies related to mathematics) was 
used with 15-year-old students in the German exten-
sions of the international large-scale study PISA 2003 
(OECD, 2004). Like the knowledge test for the 10-
year-olds and similar to the metacognitive knowledge 
test for reading described above, the mathematics-re-
lated metacognitive knowledge test consisted of scenar-
ios, each offering different strategic approaches that the 
students had to judge concerning their appropriateness 
and effectiveness for the specific learning or problem-
solving scenario at hand. The internal consistency of 
the metacognition scale was sufficient, with 
Cronbach’s alpha equaling 0.78. Given that in the PISA 
2003 assessment, mathematics was the major assess-
ment domain of the study and particularly because the 
operationalization of mathematics performance is 
based on the notions of applying mathematics in every-
day life and mathematical problem solving, students’ 
performance on this test is an interesting criterion for 
studying the effects of metacognition. It is highly likely 
that mathematical problem-solving tasks are more sus-
ceptible to metacognition than routine applications of 
algorithm or highly automated processes, leading to the 
assumption that the relations between metacognition 
and mathematics performance in PISA 2003 should be 
substantial. Based on data from 1,433 15-year-old stu-
dents, this assumption could be confirmed. As for the 
10-year-olds in the aforementioned study, significant 
differences in mathematics performance as well as re-
garding metacognitive knowledge were found as a 
function of academic track. Moreover, mathematics 
performance and metacognitive knowledge were sub-
stantially correlated (r = 0.43), indicating that roughly 
18% of the variance of mathematics performance in the 
PISA 2003 test could be explained by the metacogni-
tion indicator. This finding illustrates that students’ 
metacognitive knowledge (related to mathematics) is 
not only a significant predictor of mathematics achieve-
ment, but also of high practical relevance, since meta-
cognitive knowledge is modifiable and it is likely (alt-
hough longitudinal and/or experimental studies are 
needed to prove this) that growth in metacognitive 
knowledge results in improved mathematics perfor-
mance. Against this background, it seems interesting to 
note (again) that although boys clearly outperformed 
girls on the mathematics achievement test, girls scored 
significantly higher on the metacognitive knowledge 
test for mathematics than boys. This finding probably 
indicates that girls do have a high potential for mathe-
matics, which for some unknown reason cannot be 
properly transferred into mathematics performance. 
The utility of metacognition for mathematics perfor-
mance is not restricted to the (declarative) knowledge 
component. In their comprehensive research on ele-
mentary school children’s metacognitive skills (in the 
sense of procedural metacognitive knowledge), Lu-
cangeli and Cornoldi (1997) demonstrated that chil-
dren’s monitoring and evaluation attempts were closely 
related to mathematical performance. Individual differ-
ences in metacognitive skills seem even more im-
portant in secondary school students. In a more recent 
study with older school children, Veenman (2006) ex-
plored the contribution of metacognition skills and gen-
eral intelligence to the development of mathematical 
learning performance. Metacognitive skillfulness was 
measured through systematic observation, and mathe-
matics learning was assessed by a mathematics test. 
Overall, the findings showed that both intelligence and 
metacognitive skills influenced mathematics perfor-
mance. Interestingly, metacognition outweighed intel-
ligence as predictor of mathematics learning perfor-
mance. Although related to metacognition, intelligence 
did not play a major role in secondary school students’ 
mathematics learning. 
4.2 Findings from intervention studies 
Given the consistently positive outcomes from correla-
tional studies, several intervention programs have been 
developed that aim at improving children’s metacogni-
tive knowledge as well as their metacognitive skills. 
Looking at the relationship between metacognition and 
mathematics performance based on data from interven-
tion studies is an important step: given that data from 
cross-sectional studies are not sufficient to exclude the 
possibility that effects of metacognition on mathemat-
ics achievement are caused by other unknown factors. 
Although correlational longitudinal designs are more 
appropriate in this respect, it appears that intervention 
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studies with an experimental design are more adequate 
tools to confirm the assumption that metacognition in-
deed causes gains in mathematics achievement, by 
showing that fostering metacognitive knowledge re-
sults in improved performance. A few selected inter-
vention studies focusing on this issue will be summa-
rized below. 
For instance, Cornoldi, Lucangeli, Caponi, Falco, 
Focchiatti, and Todeschini (1995) developed a system-
atic program that focused on the training of metacogni-
tive awareness and control processes, which was pre-
sented to children with and without learning difficul-
ties. In a first study carried out with normally achieving 
children, increases in metacognition were related to im-
provement in some aspects of mathematical perfor-
mance (problem solving and logical reasoning), but not 
in geometry. Findings of the second study, which fo-
cused on children with mathematics difficulties, were 
generally more impressive, showing that the learning-
disabled children benefitted considerably from the 
training program. This was also true for those children 
who were considered to be severely learning disabled 
by their teachers. 
In Germany, Cohors-Fresenborg and Kaune (2001; 
Kaune, 2006) developed a special mathematics curric-
ulum that took metacognitive activities into account, 
using a categorical system that focused on reflection 
processes and demonstrating the relevance of a dis-
course-based teaching culture for children’s under-
standing of mathematical problems. If we see it cor-
rectly, the value of this approach has been proven in 
numerous case studies. More comprehensive evalua-
tion approaches are needed to illustrate its general util-
ity. 
Another set of training studies carried out in the Neth-
erlands and based on the MASTER program (Mathe-
matics Strategy Training for Educational Remediation; 
Van Luit & Kroesbergen, 2006) focused on self-in-
struction in mathematical problem solving and was par-
ticularly designed for children with mathematics disa-
bilities. In a recent intervention study, Van Luit and 
Kroesbergen (2006) trained children with severe math-
ematics disabilities in groups of five. During the 16-
week intervention, the children did not work on any 
other math program, whereas children in the control 
group received a mathematics training based on the 
standard curriculum. The children in the training group 
received several lessons in multiplication and division. 
The major goals of the MASTER program included an 
increase in children’s orientation toward the problem 
(planning), a better understanding of the number sys-
tem, an increase in control activities (checking the cho-
sen solution strategy and the answer), and improvement 
of memorization of multiplication and division facts 
below 100. Parallel versions of a mathematics test were 
used at pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest. As a main 
result, children in the training group gained more be-
tween pre- and posttest assessments than the children 
of the control group, a finding which turned out to be 
stable throughout the follow-up period (for more de-
tails, see Van Luit & Kroesbergen, 2006). 
An intervention study with elementary school children 
was undertaken by Desoete, Roeyers, and De Clercq 
(2003) who studied the effects of so-called “off-line“ 
metacognition on mathematical problem solving (i.e., 
prediction and evaluation assessments, measured be-
fore or after the solving of mathematics exercises). This 
study showed that third graders participating in five 
metacognitive strategy instruction sessions (compared 
to students of four other experimental groups) achieved 
significant gains in the trained metacognitive skills. 
Their advantage continued to be significant in follow-
up measures on domain-specific mathematics problem-
solving knowledge. In addition, Desoete, Roeyers, and 
De Clercq (2001) were able to show that individual dif-
ferences in students’ off-line metacognition (prediction 
and evaluation) differentiated among good performers, 
moderate performers, and children with mathematics 
learning disabilities. 
Another metacognitive training program suited for sec-
ondary school students was developed in Israel by Me-
varech and Kramarski (1997, 2003; Kramarski & Me-
varech, 2003). Their instructional method was called 
IMPROVE, which is the acronym of Introducing new 
material, Metacognitive questioning, Practicing, Re-
viewing, Obtaining mastery on higher and lower cogni-
tive processes, Verification, and Enrichment and reme-
dial. The metacognitive questioning included compre-
hension questions (“What is the problem all about?“), 
connecting questions (“How does the problem relate to 
others already solved in the past?“), strategic questions 
(“What kinds of strategies are appropriate for solving 
the problem, and why?“), and, finally, reflection ques-
tions (“Does the solution make sense? Can the problem 
be solved in a different way?“). In a recent training 
study with eighth graders using a pretest–posttest de-
sign, Mevarech, Tabuk, and Sinai (2006) compared the 
effects of the IMPROVE program in educational set-
tings with and without cooperative learning environ-
ments. Their results showed that IMPROVE had the 
potential to enhance students’ mathematics problem 
solving. Students who were instructed in cooperative 
settings and additionally exposed to IMPROVE outper-
formed students who only experienced cooperative 
learning. Thus, just practicing mathematical problem 
solving in cooperative settings was not sufficient. The 
IMPROVE method had important effects on students’ 
metacognitive knowledge and skills. In particular, plan-
ning and comprehension processes as well as students’ 
reflection skills were positively affected by the pro-
gram. 
Recently, Kramarski (2008) reported about the effects 
of the IMPROVE program embedded in a 3-year train-
ing aimed at enhancing elementary school teachers’ 
mathematical knowledge. By contrasting a group of 
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teachers who either received a professional develop-
ment program alone or in combination with IMPROVE 
metacognitive questioning, she found that teachers in 
the combined program scored higher on various alge-
braic procedural and real-life tasks regarding concep-
tual mathematical explanations as well as in using self-
monitoring and evaluation strategies in algebraic prob-
lem solving. 
A rather promising approach for implementing meta-
cognitive training is the use of a computer. The possi-
bilities in terms of adaptive feedback and prompts are 
manifold and bear potential for research on metacogni-
tion as well as practical implementations (see Zimmer-
man & Tsikalas, 2005). A few such programs already 
exist, although not necessarily specific to learning 
mathematics (e.g. AutoTutor, iStart, Point & Query, see 
Graesser, McNamara, & VanLehn, 2005). For exam-
ple, Teong (2003) used a program specific to metacog-
nitive training on mathematical word-problem solving 
in a cognitive-apprenticeship computer-based environ-
ment. Forty 11–12-year-old low achievers were trained 
in this environment, and results showed that these chil-
dren outperformed control students on mathematical 
achievement tests (solving word problems). In addition, 
the trained students developed the ability to ascertain 
when to make metacognitive decisions and elicited 
more appropriate metacognitive decisions than control 
students, indicating that the cognitive-apprenticeship 
computer-based environment helps to amplify low 
achievers’ metacognitive and cognitive behaviors dur-
ing word problem solving. 
A different intervention approach was taken by Clarke, 
Waywood, and Stephens (1993), who worked on “jour-
nal writing“ in mathematics, thereby also fostering met-
acognitive processes. One major finding of their long-
term journal writing study was that students convinc-
ingly explained why they used journal writing: “Sixty 
percent of the students gave as the main reason for writ-
ing in their journal, because it helps me (…), the most 
popular justification for journal use was To help me 
learn (…) half of the student sample reported that the 
most important thing learned from journal completion 
was To be able to explain what I think.“ (p. 241). Ac-
cording to the authors, “these perceptions of the nature 
of journal use relate quite closely to the stated goals of 
the school program and suggest both cognitive and met-
acognitive consequences” (p. 241). Nevertheless, 
Clarke et al. (1993, p. 247) also reported difficulties, 
especially at the beginning of journal writing, in the 
sense that students often write descriptions of what had 
been done in classes (“We did the middle of chapter 3“) 
and were satisfied with it. It takes time and modeling to 
develop journal writing practices that have the potential 
to become a metacognitive learning tool. 
5 Concluding remarks 
Overall, the numerous studies described in this paper 
confirm the view that metacognitive knowledge and 
self-regulated, insightful use of learning strategies pre-
dict mathematics performance in primary and second-
ary school settings even after differences in intellectual 
abilities have been taken into account. They also give 
evidence that metacognitive knowledge relevant to 
school-related domains normally develops during the 
course of primary school, but is not at peak in adoles-
cence. Findings from various intervention approaches 
showed that instructional settings, including the train-
ing of metacognitive skills, can be successful from 
early school age on, and can still be effective in late 
childhood and early adolescence. 
It is obvious that the amount of research on metacogni-
tion in the domain of language arts and reading still ex-
ceeds the amount of research on metacognition in the 
domain of mathematics. Nevertheless, Schoenfeld’s 
(1992) rather negative evaluation needs to be modified. 
There has been important empirical research on meta-
cognition ever since, and there are also studies availa-
ble that emphasize on practical approaches for teachers 
(e.g., Clarke, Waywood, & Stephens 1993; Cohors-
Fresenborg & Kaune, 2001; Sjuts, 2002; Stillman & 
Galbraith, 1998). 
Nevertheless, empirical research systematically and 
thoroughly addressing the developmental relations be-
tween metacognition, general intellectual abilities, and 
prior knowledge is still rare. More longitudinal and in-
tervention studies are needed to disentangle the longi-
tudinal effects and interactions of metacognition, gen-
eral cognitive abilities, and subject matter knowledge 
in mathematics as well as in other school subject do-
mains. Such studies should help us gain a better under-
standing of their relative importance over time, the de-
velopmental mechanisms as well as stage-specific ef-
fects. Besides, another research desideratum for meta-
cognition research applies to replicable empirical evi-
dence related to the transferability of metacognition 
across situations, tasks, or domains (see also Pintrich, 
Wolters, & Baxter, 2000). 
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